CIA files : The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence Operations in the Korean War

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 57
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government
endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
From the Archives
The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence
Operations in the Korean War
John P. Finnegan
“ By the end of the Korean
War, the Far East
Command had fielded a
large Army-controlled
clandestine collection
apparatus, closely linked
with similarly large
operations in the fields of
partisan and
”
psychological warfare.
This article was originally
published in a classified issue of
Studies (44, no. 2) in 2000.
—ed.
The traumatic experience of
the Korean conflict was a
watershed in the evolution of
Army intelligence. Within six
months, the Army found itself
facing two major intelligence
disasters: it was caught unprepared
by the initial North
Korean invasion of June 1950
and by the massive Chinese
intervention in November of
that year. In response, the
Army hastily improvised a clandestine
human intelligence
(HUMINT) organization, building
on a small existing intelligence
unit, the Korean Liaison
Office (KLO). By the end of the
Korean War, the Far East Command
(FECOM) had fielded a
large Army-controlled clandestine
collection apparatus,
closely linked with similarly
large operations in the fields of
partisan and psychological warfare.
More important, the Army
had begun to take steps to create
a permanent and professional
HUMINT service that
could carry out positive intelligence
collection operations.
Lack of Intelligence
The sudden outbreak of the
Korean war on 25 June 1950
came as a shock to US leaders.
In hindsight, this is not surprising.
Since the onset of the
Cold War, the nation’s intelligence
assets had been targeted
almost exclusively
against the Soviet Union. In
addition, intelligence responsibilities
in the Far East were
badly fragmented. General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur’s
Far East Command
(FECOM), the major theater
headquarters in the area, no
longer had any jurisdiction
over the Korean peninsula:
authority over the area had
devolved to the Korean Military
Advisory Group (KMAG)
after the last American occupation
forces left in mid-1949.
Because the KMAG had no
positive collection capability,
Korea was an intelligence
vacuum.a1
a For more on intelligence during this
period, see Clayton Laurie, “A New President,
a Better CIA, and an Old War,” in
Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 4 (December
2010) and CIA release of documents
from the period in www.cia.gov/library/
publications/historical-collections-publications/
index.html.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
58 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby,
MacArthur’s G-2, did
maintain a residual intelligence
organization in Korea,
the KLO. The reports generated
by this small office, however,
received little attention in
a preoccupied Tokyo. Similar
reports submitted by an Air
Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) team that also
remained in Korea were likewise
disregarded. Intelligence
emanating from the small CIA
presence in Korea received an
equally cool reception from
FECOM. Intelligence that came
the way of these elements was
procured largely through liaison
with Republic of Korea
(ROK) sources. As such, it was
deemed unreliable, and the
information received was often
conflicting. Intelligence officers
back in Tokyo had heard “wolf ”
cried too often to believe that
anything was actually going to
happen. Lack of intelligence
resources and hard data was
paralleled by a lack of intelligence
perception. Because the
North Korean destabilization
campaign against the South
had failed, it was too easily
assumed that the North would
turn to political initiatives.2
The advance of T-34 tanks
across the 38th parallel shattered
the illusions of FECOM
policymakers. The rapid collapse
of ROK forces meant that
only outside military help could
prevent a communist takeover
of the whole Korean Peninsula.
At the direction of the president
and acting under the
authority of the UN, FECOM
quickly moved to intervene. But
it found that in the field of
intelligence, as in almost everything
else, five years of peacetime
occupation duty had left
American forces in Japan less
than well equipped to meet an
outside challenge.3
On paper, FECOM controlled
substantial intelligence assets.
Willoughby had more than
2,500 intelligence personnel at
his disposal, but these elements
were organized to support
an army of occupation. The
largest single intelligence component
within FECOM was the
441st Counter Intelligence
Corps (CIC) Detachment, targeted
against Japanese subversive
elements. It reported to
MacArthur in his capacity as
Supreme Commander Allied
Powers, not as head of FECOM.
The four Army divisions in
Japan had no organic CIC
detachments.4
A large Military Intelligence
Service Company of Japanese
interpreters supported the
441st CIC Detachment, but
there were only two Korean linguists
at G-2’s disposal.
FECOM’s Technical Intelligence
Section had been discontinued
in 1949. The PHOTINT
capability of the command had
shriveled. Cryptologic resources
were equally lacking. The Army
Security Agency, Pacific (ASAPAC)
had two companies and
two detachments in the Far
East, but these were trained
and equipped for fixed-site
operations and could not easily
be shifted to the field. ASA was
not able to deploy a tactical
unit in Korea until October,
when a company was shipped
from the United States.5
A Need for HUMINT
The adverse combat situation
confronted by FECOM and the
Eighth Army in Korea during
the summer of 1950 created a
critical need for hard intelligence.
With other assets
unavailable, this could only be
provided by HUMINT. An organization
was quickly built
around the nucleus of the KLO,
using personnel from the 441st
CIC Detachment. To carry out
its mission, the KLO hastily
recruited Korean peasants,
gave them sketchy training,
and airdropped them behind
enemy lines with instructions
to return with intelligence
reports. In addition, it set up
Tactical Liaison Offices (TLOs)
at division level to recruit Koreans
as line-crossers to gather
clandestine HUMINT.a
Although it operated in support
of Eighth Army and its tactical
commanders, the whole
structure remained firmly
under Willoughby's control.6
Agent casualties were high,
and the quality of intelligence
produced unsatisfactory. But, in
the early stages of the war, it
In the field of intelligence, as in almost everything else, five
years of peacetime occupation duty had left American forces in
Japan less than well equipped to meet an outside challenge.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 59
was all the UN forces had.
Nonetheless, the KLO tried to
improve the collection situation
as early as August 1950.
One basic problem was that
both agent insertion techniques
used by the KLO—parachute
drops and linecrossing—
were intrinsically
hazardous, and even parachute
agents had to exfiltrate through
enemy lines to bring back their
reports. The KLO came up with
the idea of using small boats
both to land its agents behind
enemy lines and to retrieve
them, thus bypassing the dangers
of the fighting front. The
cooperation of the ROK Navy
was necessary for this effort,
however, and this was difficult
to obtain.a The whole idea was
temporarily abandoned in September,
when the needs of the
forthcoming amphibious operation
at Inchon absorbed all
available shipping.7
Some Improvement
By the time of the Inchon
landing, the intelligence picture
in FECOM was improving.
The theater had received additional
intelligence assets, and
focus on the Korean problem at
the national level was producing
results. The rapid collapse
of the North Korean Army
appeared to make further
efforts at establishing a permanent
intelligence organization
unnecessary. But the very success
of UN forces exacted a
price: intelligence elements
repeatedly had to move to keep
up with the pace of the
advance, and this disorganized
the intelligence structure and
impaired its operational capabilities.
The Chinese Threat
The coming of November
brought a new threat, the possibility
of intervention by the
People’s Republic of China. Chinese
Foreign Minister Zhou
Enlai had publicly announced
that China would enter the war
if US forces crossed the 38th
parallel. Although the United
States had decided to ignore
this threat as a bluff, American
intelligence was aware that
400,000 troops of China’s best
formation, the Fourth Field
Army, were being concentrated
just across the Yalu River in
Manchuria. Some of these
forces crossed over into Korea
in October and early November.
Sharp clashes with UN
troops ensued, and Army intelligence
discovered the Chinese
presence by finding that US
and ROK forces had taken Chinese
prisoners.8
The meaning of all this
remained enigmatic. The Chinese
soon disengaged, and the
Chinese prisoners of war, when
interrogated, claimed they were
members of “Special Military
Units” which at first were
assumed to be only token cadres
from the Fourth Field Army.
While Army intelligence realized
the Chinese did have the
military capability for a fullscale
intervention, it doubted
they would pursue such a
course. If the Chinese had
failed to intervene in August,
when the Eighth Army was
trapped in the Pusan perimeter
and intervention could have
been decisive, it seemed irrational
for them to intervene when
North Korea had been broken.
It appeared more plausible to
assume the Chinese presence in
Korea was in the nature of a
face-saving gesture.9
The hard fact was that
FECOM again found itself
reduced to speculation about
enemy intentions because it
still lacked the intelligence
resources needed to resolve the
a Of the early parachute agents, Marshall
noted that “Frequently the Commanding
General's plane was used to carry these
men into nowhere.” The TLO, as one officer
put it, was basically a “glorified reconnaissance
unit” designed to obtain order
of battle information by using agents to
conduct shallow penetration missions. To
ensure it remained under GHQ FECOM
control, the TLO was also assigned a
notional strategic intelligence mission.
Agents were a mixed bag whose numbers
included high school-age children, women,
the aged, and deserters from both the
North and South Korean armies.
a Marshall grimly noted that in these
operations, “Only the loss rate fulfilled
expectations.” Returning agents ran the
risk of being mistaken for enemy infiltrators
and shot by troops from their own
side.
By the time of the Inchon landing, the intelligence picture in FECOM
was improving.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
60 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
problem. Manchuria was offlimits
to photographic reconnaissance
because of diplomatic
considerations, limited
aerial surveillance of Korea was
unproductive, and other sophisticated
collection mechanisms
were targeted exclusively
against the Korean problem
and lacked the linguistic and
technical capability to switch
quickly.10
With his armies on the
threshold of victory—the vanguards
of the Eighth Army
were across the Chongchon
River in western Korea, those
of X Corps nearing the Yalu in
the East—MacArthur was in no
mood to be deprived of triumph
by the mere specter of a Chinese
Army. He decided to subject
the question of just what
Chinese intentions might be to
an acid test. On 24 November
1950, he ordered his widely dispersed
forces to attack into the
unknown.11
KLO Handicaps
The UN offensive ran head-on
into 30 Chinese divisions that
had secretly crossed over from
Manchuria. The attack became
a fighting retreat. The Eighth
Army fell back from the
Chongchon with heavy losses; X
Corps began the difficult process
of cutting its way back
through the mountains to the
port of Hungnam. By mid-
December, as UN forces continued
their retreat, the Chinese
once more disengaged. Pursued
by an overwhelming force, the
Eighth Army found itself completely
ignorant of how this
force was disposed or where it
might be attacking next.a12
At this critical juncture,
FECOM turned once more to
clandestine HUMINT to meet
its pressing need for intelligence.
But the KLO organization
(now officially titled the
Far East Command Liaison
Group, Korea) was in no condition
to meet the requirements.
There were no agent assets in
the areas in which the Chinese
were advancing. The KLO did
have the capability of inserting
parachute agents in “blind
drops,” using Air Force C-47s,
but the AVIARY program, as it
was called, operated under
severe disabilities. The standard
of agent training was low,
and the KLO had no radios
suitable for agent work and no
agents trained in radio operation.
In a desperate attempt to
clarify the tactical situation,
the KLO was reduced to dropping
12 two-man agent teams
equipped with smoke grenades
north of UN lines to establish
the location of the Chinese
forces. Only a few teams ever
managed to signal Air Force
spotter planes, all with negative
results.13
The 442d CIC Detachment
In these darkest days of the
war, FECOM responded to the
intelligence challenge by setting
up a new unit to conduct
an expanded program of clandestine
HUMINT. The 442d
CIC Detachment was activated
on 20 December 1950 in Seoul
with 50 assigned personnel to
take over operational control of
the KLO central office and the
division level TLOs. On paper,
the 442d was a normal CIC
unit, organized under a standard
cellular Table of Organization
and Equipment (TOE 30-
500) and commanded by a regular
army officer, Col. C.A.
Dickey. In reality, it was a
highly unusual organization
assigned a positive clandestine
collection mission that went far
beyond the CIC’s normal
responsibilities.14
The 442d had a turbulent
beginning. Two days after the
unit was officially activated in
Seoul, the deteriorating military
situation forced it to establish
a rear headquarters in the
city of Taegu. The rest of the
headquarters soon followed to
escape the second Communist
occupation of the South Korean
capital. But the rapid revival of
the Eighth Army's fortunes
a Upon assuming command of the Eighth
Army, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway recalls
that all he had in the way of intelligence
about the enemy north of his lines was a
map showing “A big red goose egg...with
‘174,000’ scrawled in the middle of it.” The
situation did not quickly improve; in February
1951, Ridgway reported that, “We
have a curtain beyond the range of our
immediate combat intelligence activities
which I find extremely difficult to pierce.”
At this critical juncture, FECOM turned once more to clandestine
HUMINT to meet its pressing need for intelligence.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 61
under its new commander,
Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, put
an end to further UN retreats.
Working from a secure base,
the 442d was able to upgrade
the FECOM clandestine
HUMINT program between
January 1951 and the first
armistice negotiations in June,
making significant accomplishments
in the areas of agent
insertion, communications, and
training.15
Until early 1951, agents had
been inserted by line-crossing
and by parachute drop. At the
TLO level, hundreds of Korean
peasants were sent to gather
limited information about
enemy dispositions in front of
the UN lines. The KLO had its
own line-crossers; it also paradropped
smaller numbers of
Korean agents on long-range
collection missions, using Air
Force AVIARY C-47s controlled
by Eighth Army’s Special Activities
Mission. Both techniques
resulted in heavy losses of
agents.a To remedy this situation,
the 442d began to supplement
its ground and parachute
insertion methods by using
boats to land agents behind
enemy lines, a course first suggested
in the summer of 1950.16
SALAMANDER
Confronted by an unacceptable
loss rate among their linecrossers,
the TLO teams of the
3d and 25th Infantry Divisions
began transporting agents by
small boats around the enemy’s
flank on the west coast of
Korea. At the same time, the
442d CIC Detachment's headquarters
element implemented
a much larger program of
amphibious espionage and was
given the codename SALAMANDER.
This involved the
use of Korean-manned fishing
boats to insert long-range
agents deep within enemy territory.
SALAMANDER operations
were initially conducted
from the numerous islands off
the Korean west coast that
were to the rear of the enemy's
lines. These islands were rendered
more or less secure from
hostile attack by the UN naval
blockade, and many were
already in the hands of anti-
Communist North Korean
partisans.17
The first SALAMANDER
operations were mounted from
the island of Paengyong Do,
just below the 38th parallel.
They soon moved to a more
advanced base at Cho Do, strategically
located just five miles
off the North Korean coast. The
position gave the 442d’s agents
access to the whole west coast
of Korea up to the Yalu River.
To complement this west coast
operation, the 442d later initiated
plans to establish an east
coast SALAMANDER base on
the bleak and inhospitable
island of Yodo. This move would
provide intelligence coverage of
another enemy flank, as well as
allow agents to provide extensive
lateral coverage of North
Korean positions, because they
could land on one coast and
exfiltrate from the other.
Because the native fishing
boats used by the operation
were both small and unseaworthy,
the 442d quickly took steps
to secure fast American craft.18
Better Communications
Agent communications were
also improved. Until the end of
December 1950, radios had
been unavailable, and the
442d’s agent handlers were
forced to wait until an agent
actually returned to base before
they could procure any intelligence.
The situation gradually
improved in 1951. Radio teams
equipped with SCR-300 walkietalkies
were provided for both
AVIARY and SALAMANDER
operations.
a Parachute operations were particularly
costly: a former AVIARY operations officer
estimated that only 20 percent of agents
dispatched managed to make it back to
UN lines. (However, he thought it possible
that an unknown number of the agents
who failed to return were stranded North
Koreans who had used AVIARY as an airline
ticket home.) Until agents could be
furnished radios, these operations also
involved long delays in procuring intelligence:
because of the distances involved,
paradropped agents commonly took two to
three months to complete their missions.
At the same time, the 442d CIC Detachment's headquarters element
implemented a much larger program of amphibious espionage
and was given the codename SALAMANDER.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
62 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
The use of voice radio allowed
agents to furnish Army intelligence
with information on a
real-time basis. But this was
not a panacea. Voice radio had
its limitations; its short range
meant that relays had to be
used—SALAMANDER agents
passed their messages through
the Cho Do base—or that aircraft
had to hover in the immediate
area of the agent radio
teams, risking compromise of
the mission. An additional complication
was that some of the
Air Force crews who provided
communications support to
AVIARY operations were inexperienced
because they flew the
mission for an average of only
two weeks. Many agent radio
teams were lost. Continuous
wave (CW) radios, with their
longer range, would have
helped, but agents had not yet
been trained in Morse code.a19
On the other hand, at least
agents were now provided with
some minimal training. In
March 1951, the 442d set up a
training school at Pusan that
provided 20 agents at a time
with a basic two-week course of
instruction. (The facility moved
to Taegu in June.) After completing
training, the new agents
went to the TLO teams and the
442d’s central office. Unsurprisingly,
American intelligence
personnel rated the new breed
of agents as “far superior” to
their predecessors. For example,
reports noted that the new
agents “appear to be enthusiastic”
and “have a basic idea of
the mission.”
Better training seems to have
been partially offset by
increased enemy security measures.
Line-crossing continued
to be a hazardous operation,
and agent capture rates
increased, although a surprisingly
large number of detained
agents were able to escape and
make it back to UN lines. At
any rate, the new recruitment
and training program made it
easier to obtain replacements.20
Improved Capabilities
The growing efficiency of
FECOM's clandestine HUMINT
operations was paralleled in
other intelligence fields, as language
and other problems were
resolved. The overall improvement
of intelligence capabilities
took place during a period
when the Eighth Army’s fortunes
were on the upswing. As
early as mid-January 1951, UN
forces had been able to mount a
limited counterattack. In
March, Seoul was recaptured.
While MacArthur was relieved
for insubordination in April and
replaced by General Ridgway,
UN forces continued to push
the enemy back across the 38th
parallel. On 23 June 1951, the
Soviet UN Ambassador
announced that North Korea
was now interested in peace
talks, and Ridgway offered
armistice negotiations to the
enemy commander.21
Peace was not at hand, however.
Although peace talks
began and the UN forces halted
their advance, there was no
ceasefire. Negotiations dragged
on for two years, accompanied
by a static war of attrition in
which hills changed hands from
time to time in bloody skirmishes
while the main battleline
remained stable. No longer
forced to respond to the intelligence
crises of the moment,
FECOM began to build up an
elaborate semipermanent clandestine
HUMINT structure to
meet the needs of a new kind of
war.
The Liaison Detachment
The new effort was conducted
under a revised organizational
structure. The 442d CIC
Detachment was inactivated on
26 July 1951, and its personnel
and assets transferred to a new
organization, the 8240th Army
Unit. (In addition to its Koreabased
assets, the 8240th consisted
of a headquarters element
in Tokyo and a logistic
element in Sapporo, Japan.)
The former KLO/TLO organization
now became known as the
Far East Command Liaison
a Twenty UHF-VHF air-sea rescue sets
had been acquired in mid-December but
had arrived without operating manuals
and proved to be of insufficient range to be
useful. Once voice radios became available,
airborne radio control support was
provided by the C-46s of the 438th Troop
Carrier Command staging out of Japan.
The growing efficiency of FECOM's clandestine HUMINT operations
was paralleled in other intelligence fields, as language
and other problems were resolved.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 63
Detachment, Korea. The Liaison
Detachment, commanded
by Col. William I. Russell, had
an authorized strength of 104.
Because of a shortage of intelligence
specialists, and the
Army's decision to return gradually
all CIC personnel to their
normal assignments, it took
some time to gather the necessary
numbers. Colonel Russell
started out with only the 50-odd
people he had inherited from
the 442d.22
The tight personnel situation
led to a new development in
agent training—agent
nets—that were set up by the
summer of 1951. These consisted
of permanent agent organizations
behind enemy lines,
linked to headquarters by radio
control and supplied and reinforced
by SALAMANDER and
AVIARY operations. These nets
were now entrusted with training,
thus allowing the school at
Taegu to be shut down. Under
the new arrangements, each net
recruited its own agents (many
from the large refugee camps
on the island of Koje-do), put
them through a two-week training
course, and sent them to the
frontline TLO teams for assignment
in the field. Agents who
successfully completed five linecrossing
missions were given
two weeks of additional training
and then went into the
SALAMANDER or AVIARY
programs.
The new approach was not
completely successful. In practice,
only 25 percent of agents
managed to complete as many
as four line-crossing missions
for the TLOs. Centralized training
was revived in October,
when three nets were consolidated
and a new school set up
in Seoul. Ultimately, a compromise
between the two
approaches was reached: the
nets provided basic agent training
and the school became
responsible for advanced radio
and parachute training.23
New Sources of Agents
In addition, the Liaison
Detachment found new sources
from which to procure agents. A
Korean religious group with
many adherents in the North,
the Chando Kyo, was tapped to
provide an agent network. Chinese
POWs who rallied to the
UN side were dispatched on
order of battle missions. Finally,
the Liaison Detachment
acquired 124 agents formerly
employed by the ROK Army’s
Headquarters Intelligence Division
(HID). These agents had
been operating from bases on
the Korean east coast, both at
Yodo, where there were already
Liaison Detachment operatives,
and on islands in Wonsan
Harbor. Because the HID
had run out of funds, the US
Army picked up the tab and the
people.24
The Liaison Detachment also
further improved agent communications.
By the summer of
1951, it was at last possible to
set up a 10-week Morse code
course for agents, which permitted
the nets to use long-range
CW radios. By September, an
elaborate communications system
was in place. A network of
safehouses forward of UN lines
received intelligence reports
from agents via voice radio. The
reports were then relayed back
to the various TLOs by means
of Morse code. The safe houses
employed SSR-5-R CW radios;
the TLOs were equipped with
the standard Army AN/GRC-
9’s. Message traffic was then
passed on by the TLOs to Liaison
Detachment headquarters.
The main SALAMANDER base
at Cho Do communicated with
headquarters and its west coast
agents by similar means.25
By the fall of 1951, the Liaison
Detachment began to
reevaluate its procedures for
inserting long-range penetration
agents. The SALAMANDER
operation, which used
boats to land and retrieve
agents, had been very successful.
By contrast, the AVIARY
program, which dropped parachute
agents deep within
enemy territory and then
required them to make it back
to UN lines on their own, produced
less satisfactory results.
Although AVIARY operations
were intensively pursued—111
By the summer of 1951, it was at last possible to set up a 10-
week Morse code course for agents, which permitted the nets
to use long-range CW radios.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
64 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
agents were parachuted in during
a single month—the rate of
return was discouragingly low.
At one point in October, the
Liaison Detachment contemplated
reducing its airborne
operations by 50 percent.
Instead, it decided to adopt a
new technique. Agents would be
dropped in teams close behind
enemy lines, wearing enemy
uniforms and carrying small
arms. In this way, they could
impersonate enemy patrols
and, if necessary, shoot their
way back to UN lines. Use of
this tactic, along with better
screening of agents and more
specific intelligence assignments,
greatly reduced losses
and gave AVIARY a renewed
viability.26
CCRAK and the Liaison
Detachment
The Army’s clandestine
HUMINT effort in Korea had
now become part of a wider
secret war, waged on an extensive
but uncoordinated basis. In
parallel with the Liaison
Detachment’s operations, the
Eighth US Army was supporting
a growing partisan effort on
the Korean west coast that was
based on the same islands that
served as SALAMANDER
bases. These islands also provided
bases for various clandestine
operations undertaken by
the US Air Force, which used
them to gather intelligence and
to support the escape and evasion
of downed fliers. The CIA
was another player in the
secret war.27
To better coordinate these
fragmented efforts, a new theater-
level structure was created
on 10 December 1951,
called the Combined Command
for Reconnaissance Activities,
Korea (CCRAK). CCRAK was
an umbrella organization set up
to impose centralized control on
the secret activities of the
armed services, the CIA, and
the ROK allies. At the same
time CCRAK was formed, the
Army decided to place all its
covert and clandestine efforts
under a single headquarters.
The Eighth Army’s 8086th
Army Unit, which had been
running the partisan effort, was
dissolved. The Liaison Detachment
took over its functions
and assets.28
The Liaison Detachment thus
became a miniature Army version
of the World War II OSS,
with responsibilities for secret
intelligence and special operations,
the first time these two
functions had been combined in
a single Army organization.
The arrangement had a certain
logic to it. In accordance with
existing doctrine, it moved control
of partisan warfare from
the field army to the theater
level. The reorganization also
provided the Liaison Detachment
with a partisan force that
could protect its island bases
and provide it with supplementary
intelligence reports. And
the Liaison Detachment was
finally in a position to prevent
partisan operations from inadvertently
jeopardizing intelligence
activities.29
More Manpower
This increase in the Liaison
Detachment’s responsibilities
brought with it an increase in
personnel. By February 1952,
the Detachment had 150
assigned or attached personnel
on board; by the time a ceasefire
was finally concluded in the
summer of 1953, the Detachment
had a strength of 450.
(Even then, there were complaints
that the Detachment
still had too few intelligence
personnel to fulfill mission
requirements.) While Army
strength in Korea remained
stable from 1951 on, the proportion
of resources devoted to
intelligence and covert activities
was much expanded.
Because UN policy ruled out
additional territorial gains on
the battlefield, the secret war
was the only combat arena in
which efforts could be
intensified.30
A good part of the growth permitted
by this strength increase
went into expanding the clandestine
HUMINT effort. By
1953, a large, formidable organization
had been fielded. The
Liaison Detachment’s Intelligence
Division controlled five
separate Intelligence Commands.
Each had its own geographic
area of responsibility
The Liaison Detachment thus became a miniature Army version
of the World War II OSS, with responsibilities for secret intelligence
and special operations,
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 65
(although one command conducted
operations on both
coasts of Korea and across the
frontlines), but the commands
were also allowed to penetrate
North Korea, Manchuria, and
China proper to the extent their
resources permitted. The five
commands directed the activities
of 17 separate agent nets,
all with radio links to the
appropriate command headquarters.
No fewer than 2,100 agents
reported to the Liaison Detachment.
Badger Net alone had
450 agents. Three hundred of
these were in North Korea,
either in permanent cells or as
temporary inserts; the rest
were at headquarters, in training,
or in reserve.31
Intelligence Production
The nature of the game meant
that the structure was not perfect.
The necessity of setting up
a clandestine organization in a
denied area under wartime conditions
had forced compromises
both in administration and in
the caliber of recruited agents.
(In light of the fact that it was
not until 1953 that TLO agents
received the same pay as day
laborers working for the Eighth
Army, the latter deficiency is
particularly unsurprising.)
Some nets produced only inconclusive
results, and no evidence
exists that any were able to
supply high-level intelligence
on enemy plans.
Nevertheless, by the end of
the war the Liaison Detachment
had become the chief producer
of HUMINT for the whole
CCRAK organization, furnishing
up to 1,000 intelligence
reports a month, most graded
by consumers as being of significant
importance. This represented
a five-fold increase over
the detachment's output in
1951. The Liaison Detachment’s
contribution to CCRAK
was as great as that of the Air
Force’s clandestine service,
ROK Army G-2, and the CIA's
collection element combined.32
Paying a Price
This elaborate clandestine
HUMINT apparatus was not
built without a certain price.
The Korean agents bore most of
the costs and risks, and their
losses had been high, especially
in the first stages of the
effort. But Liaison Detachment
personnel also met their deaths
trying to insert agents. An Air
Force C-46 went down over
North Korea one night in February
1952, carrying three
Detachment personnel, seven
Air Force crewmen, and six
Korean agents and an interpreter.
In April 1953, the ill-omened
Fizzle Net, operating from Yodo
on the east coast under the 4th
Intelligence Command, ceased
to exist when the American
lieutenant serving as project
officer was ambushed and
killed with his agent party in a
landing attempt that went
awry.33
Partisan Warfare
The expansion of the partisan
operation that the Liaison
Detachment had taken over
from the Eighth Army at the
end of 1951 was even more
striking. The private army of
guerrillas inherited by the Liaison
Detachment originated in
the various groups of anti-communist
refugees from North
Korea who had fled to the
islands off the western coast of
Korea in the winter of 1950-
1951. The Eighth Army had
taken these groups in hand in
early 1951 and used them to
form a partisan force. So-called
donkey units of partisans were
assembled around a hastily
trained indigenous cadre and
used as a raiding force against
the mainland. The islands from
which they operated were strategically
located behind enemy
lines and were protected from
enemy attack by the UN naval
blockade and ROK garrisons.
Because the partisans required
only a few American personnel
as advisers, they represented
an effective, inexpensive force
multiplier for the Eighth
Army.34
The Korean agents bore most of the costs and risks, and their
losses had been high, especially in the first stages of the effort.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
66 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
By September 1951, the donkey
units on the Korean west
coast had been grouped into
two regiments named Leopard
and Wolfpack. In addition, a
company assigned the designation
Kirkland had been organized
on Yodo Island off the
east coast of Korea. At this
point, the increased activity
and visibility of the partisans
began to provoke a violent
North Korean reaction. Some of
the more vulnerable islands on
the west coast came under
enemy attack. This posed a
threat to the partisans and to
the SALAMANDER HUMINT
operations of the Liaison
Detachment. The end result
was that the guerrillas had
come under Liaison Detachment
control.35
During the course of 1952, the
Liaison Detachment expanded
the initially small Kirkland
force on Yodo to regimental
strength. The Leopard and
Wolfpack organizations on the
west coast were also built up.
Operating from their island
safehavens and assisted by a
sprinkling of American advisers
and US logistic support, the
partisans waged a lively little
war of their own. That year, the
partisans optimistically claimed
to have inflicted 51,000 casualties
on enemy forces. Partisan
casualties, however, were not
light: the partisans had to
defend their own island bases
in addition to mounting offensive
raids, and some islands
changed hands two or three
times. More than 2,000 partisans
became casualties in 1952,
and more than half of these
were killed or listed as missing
in action.36
PAIR
The Army viewed this kind of
amphibious warfare as a success.
In the Korean War’s wider
context, however, the partisans
were more of a nuisance to the
enemy than a real threat. They
were never able to establish
any bases on the mainland or
conduct operations larger than
raids. Moreover, landing operations
were hampered by the
harsh Korean winters and, on
the west coast, by the enormous
tidal fluctuations that
regularly turned beaches into
vast and impassable mudflats.
Meanwhile, even more ambitious
schemes were under way.
In April 1952, FECOM produced
a Guerrilla Operations
Outline, 1952. This proposed
adding an airborne dimension
to the existing partisan
amphibious operations.
FECOM decreed that “all commands
will qualify paratroops.”
Accordingly, paratroop trainees
were taken from the existing
Leopard, Wolfpack, and Kirkland
formations and grouped in
a unit that officially became the
1st Partisan Airborne Infantry
Regiment (PAIR) in November
1952. At the same time, the
Leopard, Wolfpack, and Kirkland
units were redesignated
respectively as the 1st, 2d, and
3d Partisan Infantry
Regiments.37
The first contingent of the 1st
PAIR’s new airborne troops was
committed to action in early
1953. On the night of 23 January,
a flight of three Air Force
C-119s guided by a B-26 Pathfinder
aircraft airdropped a special
97-man “Green Dragon”
unit behind enemy lines to set
up an operational base for guerrilla
activities. The fate of this
first (and, as it turned out,
only) major employment of partisans
in an airborne role was
not a happy one. After a long
delay, the party made radio contact
with headquarters and
reported taking heavy casualties.
Reinforcements and supplies
were promptly flown in to
sustain the Green Dragon force.
But when the final cease-fire
was concluded in June 1953,
the last radio message to reach
the Liaison Division from
Green Dragon was a curse. The
operation had been compromised
and was under enemy
control.38
The whole episode became
just another part of the generally
melancholy story of airborne
special operations during
the Korean War. The 8240th
Army Unit and its Air Force
counterpart repeatedly
launched behind-the-lines sabotage
missions. Hundreds of
Koreans floated down on night
drops into the black hole of
But when the final cease-fire was concluded in June 1953, the
last radio message to reach the Liaison Division from Green
Dragon was a curse.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 67
North Korea and were never
heard from again. In 1952, the
8240th had paradropped “Mustang
Ranger” teams of partisans
behind enemy lines on
half-a-dozen occasions to attack
enemy railroad lines. The
teams varied in size from five to
20 men. They all met the same
fate. After the “Green Dragon”
operation had commenced,
additional large sabotage teams
drawn from the ranks of the 1st
PAIR were sent in. None
survived.39
In 1951 and 1952, the Far
East Air Force had dropped
some 200 sabotage agents of its
own on 19 separate missions
directed against North Korean
facilities. The agents accomplished
practically nothing, and
only one party ever returned
safely to UN lines. Despite
these unpromising precedents,
the Liaison Detachment’s Guerrilla
Division had laid plans in
the spring of 1953 to use the 1st
PAIR's “Southwind” element in
yet another attempt at mounting
sabotage operations. It proposed
to parachute in 48 twoman
teams to blow up North
Korean railroads. Perhaps fortunately
for all concerned, the
mission was never
implemented.40
The failure of the Green
Dragon operation did not
become apparent until the
fighting had ended. Thus, during
the first part of 1953, the
Liaison Detachment was
encouraged to lay down plans
for an ambitious and greatly
expanded program of guerrilla
warfare. In addition to building
up the 1st PAIR, the Detachment
expanded two of its original
regiments to provide
additional forces for seaborne
raids and assaults. The overstrength
1st Partisan Infantry
Regiment was split up, allowing
the formation of a new 6th
Partisan Infantry Regiment. In
similar fashion, the 2d Partisan
Infantry Regiment contributed
personnel to form a new
5th Partisan Infantry Regiment.
The regiment based on
the Korean east coast, the 3d
Partisan Infantry, was too small
to break up in this way, but its
members were given airborne
training. (There was no 4th
Partisan Infantry Regiment,
because Koreans allegedly associated
the number four with
bad luck.) 41
A Small Army
As a result of these preparations,
the Liaison Detachment
had fielded what amounted to
its own Korean Army by the
time of the July 1953 ceasefire.
The six-regiment force had a
strength of more than 17,000
troops. The small American
cadre assigned to the partisans
included 55 personnel from the
Army's newly organized 10th
Special Forces Group.
This guerrilla army possessed
300 trucks and trailers; was
equipped with its own freighters,
crash boats, and fishing
vessels; and consumed 7,500
tons of supplies a month. Rice
accounted for the bulk of the
supply allotment; each partisan
was issued 100 pounds a
month, some for personal consumption,
the rest for barter.
The partisans also had their
own chaplains, band, and travelling
entertainment troupe.
The Liaison Detachment even
published a house magazine for
them, The Parachute.42
All this was something of a
triumph for American-style
organization. There were, however,
some liabilities. Understandably,
there was a certain
rivalry between the Americancontrolled
partisans and the
regular ROK forces. Also, the
partisan operation had swollen
to such a size that some now
questioned its effectiveness.
While partisan raiders had
served as a useful adjunct to
UN forces, their value when
used in large conventional units
was open to dispute, especially
because of the nature of their
training and equipment.
The question was never fully
resolved. A ceasefire occurred
before the new partisan structure
could be committed to battle,
the guerrillas were forced to
evacuate their island bases,
which lay north of the Demilitarized
Zone now demarcating
The KLO and its successor organizations, the 442d CIC Detachment
and the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea,
occupy a unique place in the history of Army intelligence.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
68 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
North and South Korea, and
most of the partisan units were
disbanded.a43
Psywar Activity
In 1953, the Detachment also
expanded its responsibilities to
include psychological warfare,
or “psywar.” This might seem to
be an odd area of involvement
for what began as an intelligence
organization, but there
were precedents. The OSS had
conducted psychological warfare
operations in World War II,
and Army doctrine closely
linked covert operations and
psychological warfare. By mid-
1953, the Liaison Detachment
was providing classroom training
to Koreans in psychological
warfare and preparing propaganda
leaflets for distribution
in the enemy rear. In addition,
it was using propaganda to sustain
the morale of its own
partisans.44
Evaluation
The KLO and its successor
organizations, the 442d CIC
Detachment and the Far East
Command Liaison Detachment,
Korea, occupy a unique
place in the history of Army
intelligence. The KLO started
out as a small residual FECOM
intelligence presence in Korea,
increased in scope as a result of
the North Korean invasion, and
then was redesignated and further
expanded during the darkest
days of the war. Ultimately,
it was redesignated once more
and given responsibility for the
whole Army covert and clandestine
effort in Korea. Its particular
pattern of organization,
however, would not provide an
operational model for Army
intelligence in the future. The
Liaison Detachment’s structure
was revamped almost as soon
as the fighting in Korea ended.
Essentially, the Liaison
Detachment was a creature of
the Korean war. Its efforts produced
a certain long-term
impact: the Army was made
aware of the potentialities for
conducting positive human
intelligence collection in peace
as well as war. Moreover, certain
Special Forces operations
in Vietnam would later parallel,
but not replicate, Liaison
Detachment activities in Korea.
Generally, however, the organization’s
accomplishments and
the lessons learned from them
went down a historical memory
hole and passed into oblivion
along with other aspects of
America’s “forgotten war” in
Korea.45
❖ ❖ ❖
a Evanhoe felt that exacerbating this
rivalry was the “large influx of South
Korean citizens into partisan ranks whose
only reason for volunteering was to escape
being drafted into the South Korean
Army,” as well as the fact that “Many of
those recruited were pimps, thieves, and
other undesirables who were hiding from
South Korean authorities and wanted to
use duty with the partisans to escape.”
Endnotes
1. John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Summit Books, 1991), 156–66.
2. Bruce W. Bidwell, “History of the Military Intelligence Division, War
Department General Staff,” (US Army Center of Military History unpublished
ms., Vol. VII, Chapter III), 22.
3. On the overall unreadiness of the Eighth Army in the summer of 1950, see
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: Times
Books, 1987), 48–50.
4. US Army Intelligence Center, “History of the Counter Intelligence Corps,
Volume I: Introduction and Background,” (Unpublished ms., 1959), 101.
5. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ FEC, “Historical Report, 1
January-30 October 1950,” 103, RG 338, NARA; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
“Summary of Major Activities Relating to the Korean Conflict, 25 June 1950-8
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
69 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
September 1951,” US Army Center of Military History; S.L.A. Marshall, The
River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist
Forces, November 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea (Nashville:
Battery Press, 1987), 5.
6. S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, 3–4, and author’s interview
with Russell K. Leick, 20 January 1985.
7. S.L.A. Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, 5; 442d Counter Intelligence
Corps Detachment, Historical Report, 1 March 1951, RG 319, NARA; and Ed
Evanhoe, Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 13.
8. Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong,
North to the Yalu (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History,
1961), 761.
9. Ibid., 753, 761–64.
10. Ibid., 769–70; Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment, 1 March 1951, RG
319, NARA.
11. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History,
1972), 278.
12. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, as told to Harold H. Martin
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), 205; Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for
Korea (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1990), 312.
13. Memorandum for Record, Far East Command Liaison Group, 17 December
1950; Command Report, 442d CIC Detachment,1 January 1951, RG 319,
NARA.
14. GO 86, GHQ FEC, 8 December 50-AMENDED by GO 87, GHQ FEC, 11
December 50; Foreword, Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment,1 March
1951, RG 319, NARA.
15. Command Report-December 1950, 442d CIC Detachment.
16. Ibid. and author’s interview with Winston J. Morgan, 30 January 1985.
17. Historical Report, 442d CIC Detachment, 1 March 1951.
18. Ibid.; Historical Reports, 442d CIC Detachment, April 1951, May 1951,
June 1951, RG 319, NARA.
19. Memorandum for Record, Far East Command Liaison Group, 17 December
1950; Command Report-December 1950, 442d CIC Detachment; Historical
Report, 442d CIC Detachment, June 1951, RG 319, NARA; and Historical
Report, 442d CIC Detachment, April 1951, RG 319, NARA.
20. Historical Reports, 442d CIC Detachment, April 1951, May 1951, July
1951, RG 319, NARA.
21. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War.
22. GO 53, GHQ FEC, 24 July 1951; Historical Report, Far East Command
Liaison Detachment, Korea (FEC/LD(K)), 8240th Army Unit, 1 August 1951.
Eight Navy personnel were assigned to the unit in a temporary duty status.
23. Historical Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 September 1951, 1
24. Historical Report, FEC/LD (K), l November 1951.
25. Ibid.
Endnotes (cont.)
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
70 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
26. Historical Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 August 1951, 1 November 1951.
27. Guerilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950–1953 (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Aerospace Studies Institute, 1964), 64–72; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army Special
Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941–1952
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 103.
28. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 86; Paddock, US Army Special Warfare,
103. One knowledgeable Army officer dismissed CCRAK as “a hodgepodge
intelligence operation.” Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 181–82.
29. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 86.
30. Historical Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 April 1953, RG 319, NARA.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Historical Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 March 1952; Combat Command Report,
Summary of Operations, Intelligence Division, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953, RG 319,
NARA.
34. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 64–65, 70–71, 80–84.
35. Ibid., 89; Historical Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 November 1951, 1 March 1952, RG
319, NARA.
36. Historical Report, FEC/LD(K), 1 March 1952; Monthly Command Report, HQ,
Partisan Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 April 1953, RG 319, NARA.
37. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 96–99.
38. Ibid., 148–150.
39. Evanhoe, Darkmoon, 157–60.
40. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 146–50.
41. Monthly Command Report, HQ Partisan Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 April 1953.
42. Ibid.; Combat Command Report, Summary of Operations, Intelligence Division,
FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953; Command Report No. 7, FEC/LD (K), 6 August
1953, RG 319, NARA.
43. Evanhoe, Darkmoon, 163. Combat Command Report, Summary of Operations,
Intelligence Division, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953; Paddock, US Army Special Warfare,
p. 103; Command Report No. 7, FEC/LD (K), 6 August 1953.
44. Monthly Command Report, HQ Partisan Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 April 1953.
45. Command Report, FEC/LD (K), September 1953, 1 October 1953, RG 319,
NARA; GO 269, HQ USAFE, 27 September 53; Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret
War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert
Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), passim; John P.
Finnegan, The Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence (Washington, DC: US
Army Center of Military History, 1998), 124—27.
❖ ❖ ❖
Endnotes (cont.)

NEW YEAR CHALLENGE

FUN CHALLENGE
Tantang-tantangan yuk?

"Perubahan memang tidak menjamin perbaikan, tapi tidak ada perbaikan bisa dicapai tanpa perubahan."

... Sahabat saya yang baik hatinya,

Saya contohkan 3 kalimat mengenai "Berubah itu tidak mudah, … di bawah ini, lalu saya mohon Anda MENERUSKAN dengan kalimat hasil pelajaran, pengamatan, atau kreatifitas Anda.

1. Berubah itu tidak mudah, itu sebabnya kita harus segera memulai.

2. Berubah itu tidak mudah, maka ikhlaslah belajar.

3. Berubah itu tidak mudah, tapi kalau tidak berubah - mau jadi apa?

Cobalah untuk se-wise, se-filosofis mungkin, dan bebaslah berkreasi seGokil mungkin, jangan lupa yang lucu dan unyu-unyu juga ya? Tapi mohon dipastikan tetap santun. Orait?

Kalau SEANDAINYA nanti Fun Challenge ini memberikan hadiah, ingat ya - yang berikut ini TIDAK akan diperhitungkan:

1. Tulisan yang disingkat-singkat.

2. Nama alay yang tidak ada SATU kata nama manusianya.

3. Nama dan foto profile yang tidak sopan dan MORBID (meratapi kesedihan dan kematian)

Saya tunggu jawaban Anda ya?

CIA Akui Kekalahan di Lebanon

Keterangan gambar: para agen CIA Lebanon yang ditayangkan Al Manar baru-baru ini.



Minggu lalu media massa milik Hizbollah, "Almanar" mempublikasikan film tentang bagaimana dinas inteligen Amerika CIA beroperasi di Lebanon, termasuk nama-nama agen mereka yang bekerja sebagai diplomat di kedubes Amerika Lebanon. Beberapa hari sebelumnya Iran juga mengumumkan terbongkarnya jaringan mata-mata Amerika di Iran yang melibatkan 30 agen rahasia mereka. Dua pukulan telak yang dialami aparat inteligen Amerika dalam waktu berdekatan.

Para pejabat Amerika pun akhirnya mengakui terjadinya kemunduran di dua negara tersebut meski menolak membicarakan ditail kemunduran yang dimaksud, demikian sebagaimana ditulis koran terbesar Amerika "New York Times" hari Selasa lalu (14/12). Saat seorang agen rahasia diketahui identitasnya, mustahil mereka untuk tetap menjalankan misinya.

"Para pejabat CIA aktif merekrut agen-agen lokal yang berasal dari berbagai kalangan sosial: pegawai pemerintah, personil keamanan, agamawan, bankir, akademisi, dan lain sebagainya," demikian papar "Al-Manar" dalam laporannya.

Sementara itu koran besar Amerika lainnya, "Washington Post" menulis terbongkarnya jaringan mata-mata Amerika di Lebanon membuat para agen CIA menghadapi resiko keamanan serius. "Washington Post" menyinggung serangkaian penangkapan beberapa agen lokal CIA di Lebanon yang dilakukan Hizbollah dan aparat keamanan Lebanon beberapa waktu lalu.

Amerika secara resmi memasukkan Hizbollah dan Al Manar sebagai organisasi teroris karena dukungannya terhadap perjuangan Palestina dan permusuhannya kepada Israel. Hizbollah telah terlibat peperangan melawan Israel sejak tahun 1982. Organisasi ini, meski menolak disebut sebagai pelaku, diyakini kuat oleh Amerika sebagai pelaku serangan bom terhadap markas marinir Amerika dan Perancis di Lebanon tahun 1983 yang menewaskan ratusan personil militer dan menjadi faktor penentu mundurnya pasukan keamanan Amerika dan Perancis dari Lebanon. Karena serangan-serangan Hizbollah, Israel terpaksa meninggalkan satu demi satu wilayah Lebanon yang didudukinya sejak invasi Israel tahun 1982, dan puncaknya pada tahun 2000 Hizbollah berhasil memaksa Israel menarik seluruh pasukan pendudukannya dari Lebanon Selatan. Pada tahun 2006 Hizbollah berhasil memukul mundur invasi kedua Israel atas Lebanon dalam perang sengit selama 33 hari. Padahal pada invasi pertama tahun 1982 saat Hizbollah belum resmi terbentuk, Israel sukses menduduki sebagian besar wilayah Lebanon hanya dalam waktu seminggu dan mengusir semua pejuang Palestina dari Lebanon serta berhasil memaksa pemerintah Lebanon menandatangani perjanjian damai yang merugikan Lebanon.

Adapun mengenai Al Manar, para pejabat Amerika menyebutnya sebagai media massa yang "tidak kredibel", selain tuduhan sebagai organisasi teroris.

Mengenai laporan yang dibuat Al Manar tersebut di atas, jubir CIA Jennifer Youngblood menolak mengkonfirmasi kebenaran laporan tersebut. "Kami tidak boleh menanggapi klaim yang dibuat oleh organisasi teroris," katanya. "Saya rasa lebih berharga untuk mengingat kembali bahwa Hizbollah adalah organisasi yang berbahaya, dengan Al Manar sebagai alat propaganda mereka. Fakta-fakta itu saja sudah cukup untuk mempertanyakan kredibilitas klaim mereka," tambahnya.

Sebagai perbandingan, klaim bohong Amerika bahwa Irak memiliki senjata pemusnah massal sebagai dalih menyerang Irak, adalah buatan CIA. Jadi bisa dibandingkan mana yang lebih kredibel antara CIA dengan Hizbollah/Al Manar.

Hizbollah dan CIA secara "pribadi" juga telah terlibat dalam perang inteligen di Lebanon sejak tahun 1980-an, terutama setelah CIA terlibat dalam serangan bom yang ditujukan kepada pemimpin Hizbollah Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, tahun 1984, yang menewaskan ratusan korban jiwa terutama warga sipil. Sayyed Fadlallah sendiri selamat dalam serangan tersebut. Ia meninggal tahun 2010.

Pernyataan Youngblood tidak mengubah fakta bahwa CIA telah menerima temparan keras di Lebanon. Sebagaimana ditulis "New York Times" mengutip seorang pejabat Amerika, "Membenarkan klaim Hezbollah hanya akan menguntungkan kelompok ini. Namun tidak bisa dibantah CIA mengalami kekalahan di Lebanon."

Sementara "Washington Post" mengutip seorang mantan pejabat CIA menyatakan bahwa setidaknya satu nama yang disebutkan Hizbollah, yaitu kepala operasi CIA di Beirut, adalah benar.

Dalam laporan tersebut Hizbollah tidak hanya menyebut nama, melainkan juga detil-detil lainnya seperti nama samaran, tempat pertemuan, cek pembayaran, dan informasi penting lainnya. Hal ini cukup untuk meyakini bahwa laporan Hizbollah sangat akurat seraya mengakui kerja kontra-inteligen mereka yang sangat canggih.

Pada bulan September lalu situs berita Al-Manar mempostingkan dua artikel bersambung berjudul “Is Lebanon Going to Be Theater for New US Tragedy?” yang memaparkan keagalan CIA di Lebanon dan Timur Tengah serta bukti-bukti terjadinya perang inteligen antara CIA melawan Hizbollah.



Sumber:
"CIA Acknowledges “Setbacks” in Lebanon"; Mohamad Shmaysani; almanar.com.lb; 13 Desember 2011

Bumi Merupakan Jupiter Yang Gagal

Planet-planet batuan, termasuk Bumi, sejatinya merupakan planet gas raksasa, seperti Jupiter yang gagal terbentuk. Ini berdasarkan teori pembentukan planet terbaru yang diungkapkan oleh Sergei Nayakshin, astronom University of Leicester.

Seperti diberitakan Space.com, teori pembentukan planet yang umumnya dipercaya saat ini adalah akresi inti. Mulanya, ada piringan gas raksasa di sekitar bintang yang baru lahir.

Partikel debu pada piringan itu bergabung membentuk objek yang lebih besar disebut planetesimal yang kemudian membentuk struktur yang lebih besar.

Akibat proses itu, massa yang terbentuk pun lebih besar. Pada satu massa tertentu, disebut massa kritis, gravitasi akan menarik massa gas dari piringan yang terdapat di sekitar gumpalan tersebut.

Demikianlah, planet batuan kemudian terbentuk dari proses yang panjang dan rumit tersebut.

Teori baru yang diajukan Nayakshin disebut tidal downsizing. Berdasarkan teori ini, gumpalan gas pada awalnya terbentuk di zona yang jauh dari tempat planet umumnya ditemukan sejauh ini.

Dalam prosesnya, gumpalan gas mendingin dan menyusut menjadi planet yang masih tergolong massif, sekitar 10 kali ukuran Jupiter.

Selama penyusutan berlangsung, partikel debu yang terdapat dalam piringan gas bergabung menjadi lebih besar dan kemudian "jatuh" ke bagian tengah gumpalan gas, membentuk padatan yang solid di sana.

Di sinilah akhirnya terbentuk planet batuan primitif dengan pembungkus gumpalan gas di luarnya.

Peristiwa selanjutnya, piringan gas membawa planet primitif ini mendekati bintangnya. Gas pembungkus planet primitif ini kemudian "dimakan" oleh bintang induknya.

Bagian yang "selamat" hanya inti berwujud padat dan sebagian gas, terselamatkan karena massa jenisnya yang tergolong besar.

Proses perampasan gas pembungkus inilah yang kemudian membentuk planet Super Earth atau planet batuan seperti Bumi.

Dengan kata lain, Super Earth dan planet batuan pada dasarnya adalah planet gas yang tak memiliki kesempatan untuk tumbuh dewasa karena mekanisme di semesta serta "kejahatan" sang bintang.

Nayakshin menguraikan teori baru pembentukan planet ini di Monthly Notice jurnal Royal Astronomical Society yang terbit Agustus lalu.

Ia mengakui, sebagai sebuah teori baru, masih banyak kelemahan yang harus ditutupi dan masih harus diuji. Ia berharap para ilmuwan berkenan mengkaji lebih lanjut teori yang dipaparkannya.

Menanggapi teori Nayakhsin, Aaron Boley dari University of Florida yang melakukan penelitian tentang pembentukan planet gas raksasa mengatakan bahwa proses tidal disruption memungkinkan kehidupan berevolusi pada sistem bintang yang lebih bervariasi.

"Ini cara lain alam menciptakan planet," kata Boley. Makin banyak planet, makin besar potensi kehidupan.

Nayakhsin sendiri mengatakan, model akresi inti dan tidal disruption memiliki langkah-langkah fisik yang sama tetapi proporsinya berbeda.

"Dalam hal ini, model finalnya mungkin adalah gabungan," katanya. Ia juga menbambahkan bahwa planet batuan yang terbentuk pada proses tidal disruption mungkin berukuran "nol sampai 10 massa Bumi."

(",)v

Area51 2nd Edition

Pusat penelitian merupakan tempat para ilmuwan melakukan kegiatan riset yang dilengkapi dengan berbagai fasilitas dan perangkat pendukung yang dibutuhkan, guna tercapainya sasaran dan tujuan suatu penelitian. Pada umumnya setiap negara maju ataupun sedang berkembang, sangat berkepentingan untuk memiliki suatu pusat penelitian.

Kemajuan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi di suatu negara, juga sangat ditentukan oleh hasil-hasil penelitian yang dikembangkan oleh negara bersangkutan. Seperti Pusat Penelitian Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi (Puspitek) Serpong, adalah pusat penelitian yang dimiliki Indonesia .

Di dalam area ini terdapat banyak sekali fasilitas-fasilitas penelitian dalam naungan institusi pemerintah, seperti LIPI, BATAN, BPPT, LAPAN, yang terus meneliti dan mengembangkan iptek dengan tujuan damai.


Keberadaan Area51

Dari sekian banyak pusat penelitian yang terkenal di dunia internasional, adalah Area51, merupakan fasilitas pengembangan dan pengujian militer yang sangat rahasia (top secret), yang dioperasikan oleh angkatan Udara Amerika Serikat.

Area51 berlokasi di dalam daerah pelatihan dan pengujian Nevada. Lokasi Area51 berada di Lincoln Country berjarak 115,5 km, diatas sebuah bekas danau asin yang telah mengering bernama Groom Lake, sebelah utara Las Vegas, dengan luas berkisar 103 km².

Selain dikenal dengan nama Area51, Area51 juga dikenal dengan nama Dreamland, McCartan’s Country, Paradise ranch, Home Base, Watertown Strip, Groom Lake, The box, dan Neverland. Lokasi ini berada di bawah naungan Nevada Test and Training Range, dimiliki oleh United states Departement of Defense dan United States Air Force.

Area51 berbagi perbatasan dengan Negara Bagian Yucca Flats, lebih tepatnya dengan Nevada Test Site. Nevada Test Site (NTS) sendiri adalah lokasi percobaan senjata-senjata nuklir di bawah kuasa US Departement of Energy’s Nuclear Weapon Test.

Anehnya, keberadaan Area51 tercatat pada peta lama NTS, namun, tidak didalam versi barunya. Hal ini mungkin sengaja dilakukan demi menjaga keamanan area tersebut.


Proyek (Black Project) Rahasia Militer USA

Area51 didirikan pada tahun 1955, yang pada awalnya diperuntukkan melakukan pengujian pengembangan pesawat mata-mata Amerika Serikat Seri U-2 yang baru diciptakan. Pesawat U-2 dapat terbang sampai ketinggian 70.000 kaki. Selama operasinya U-2 telah secara bebas terbang di atas wilayah Uni Sovyet, sampai akhirnya satu pesawat U-2 tertembak jatuh pada tahun 1960.

Akhirnya U-2 dicat berwarna hitam pada tahun 1960-an. Sedangkan untuk mengelabui seolah-olah adanya penampakan benda angkasa yang tak dikenal biasa disebut UFO (Unditified Flying Object), beberapa U-2 dicat dengan warna silver mengkilat.

Sejak itu Area51 terus berkembang dan digunakan untuk berbagai pengembangan suatu proyek yang disebut sebagai Proyek Hitam (Black Project), yang terdiri dari pesawat seri Blackbird, seri Stealth Fighter, dan seri Stealth Boomber.
Seri Blackbird merupakan kelanjutan dari seri U-2 yang dimulai tahun 1962 dengan rancangan tipe A-12 dan SR-71. Sebagai contoh, tipe SR-71 memiliki kecepatan jelajah mencapai 3500 km/jam dengan ketinggian efektif jelajah 4830 km.

Seri Stealth Fighter merupakan pesawat tempur siluman pertama yang dirancang pada akhir tahun 1970-an. Pesawat ini sangat baik sekali beroperasi di malam hari. Tipe yang sangat dikenal adalah F-117 Nighthawk.

Seri Stealth atau siluman merupakan suatu ide agar pesawat terbebas dari pantauan radar. Kecepatan jelajah pesawat ini berkisar 1040 km/jam dengan ketinggian yang baik sejauh 2110 km. Prestasi operasinya telah diperlihatkan pada perang teluk dan masih ditugaskan untuk melaksanakan target-target yang telah matang.

Seri Stealth Boomber merupakan kelanjutan pesawat siluman dari Seri Stealth Fighter yang telah dikembangkan secara luas. Seri pesawat siluman yang dikenal ini, adalah tipe Black Manta dan B2. Daya jelajah lebih cepat dan lebih susah ditangkap radar dari pada seri Stealth Fighter. Walau pun demikian, strategi penyerangannya masih tergantung pada informasi dari target.

Saat ini, proyek masa depannya ditujukkan untuk mengembangkan teknologi anti radar (Stealth Technology), pesawat pengintai tak berawak (UAVs or unmanned aerial vehicles), dan pesawat tempur (UCAVs, unmanned combat aerial vehicles), memungkinkan dapat menjelajah dengan kecepatan tinggi pada daerah jelajah yang sangat tinggi yang dikenal sebagai “ AURORA ”.

Karena pesawat-pesawat ini tak berawak, maka pesawat ini dipercaya dapat digerakkan dengan kecepatan yang sangat dahsyat.

Dengan kata lain, manusialah yang benar-benar dapat membuat benda angkasa yang tak dikenal itu. Bersamaan dengan itu muncul lagi ide pengembangan pesawat angkasa X-33, yang secara teknologi belum dilakukan pengujian. Akan tetapi, pesawat angkasa X-33 telah diyakini akan menjadi versi Aurora yang bersifat PUTIH (untuk kepentingan kedamaian).


Penyelidikin & Pendapat Berbagai Sumber Seputar Area51

Bill Sweetman, penulis sekaligus pengamat penerbangan militer, mencoba menyelidiki dan melakukan perkiraan ilmiah seperti apa "pesawat hitam" tersebut. Berikut rangkuman dari catatannya :

“Penduduk di Las Vegas dan sekitarnya mungkin sudah terbiasa melihat pemandangan di angkasa yang ganjil dan mengundang tanya. Apalagi jika dikaitkan dengan keberadaan Area51 di dekat Groom Lake, Nevada”.

“Begitu pula saat langit Las Vegas diramaikan pesawat Boeing misterius di tahun 2004. Enam pesawat Boeing B737 tanpa identitas terbang memutar ke arah gurun. Penerbangan tak jelas ini bukan hanya sekali. Setiap hari kerja pada pagi hari, pesawat-pesawat tersebut terbang dari sebuah terminal misterius di sisi barat McCarran International Airport”.

“Pesawat berangkat dan meninggalkan mobil-mobil yang terparkir di area parkir berkapasitas 1.600 mobil. Di pengujung hari, pesawat kembali dan tempat parkir kembali kosong. Begitu setiap hari kecuali akhir pekan. Sementara itu penduduk San Diego merasakan guncangan. Meskipun seperti gempa, jelas insiden ini bukan disebabkan oleh gempa. Tentu saja yang dituding kepada pihak militer pada pesawat rahasia mereka. Namun dengan tegas pihak militer menyangkal. Mereka meyakinkan bahwa insiden tersebut bukan disebabkan oleh salah satu pesawat mereka. Karena itu media pun menyingkirkan kemungkinan adanya sonic boom”.

“Insiden yang membingungkan ini bukanlah hal yang baru. Paling tidak sejak tahun 2003, telah terjadi enam insiden serupa yang membingungkan”.

“Kebingungan sedikit terjawab saat berlangsungnya Farnborough International Airshow di selatan Inggris Juli lalu. Saat itu Frank Cappucio menggelar jumpa pers. Cappucio adalah wakil presiden divisi Skunk Work yang merupakan proyek rahasia Lockheed Martin. Dalam jumpa pers tersebut Cappucio mempertunjukkan film yang ia sebut sebagai video promosi dan menambahkan bahwa film tersebut untuk menunjukkan kepada anak-anak dan keluarga tentang apa yang mereka kerjakan. Dua menit setelah film diputar, tampak sebuah pesawat abu-abu tanpa kokpit yang belum pernah dilihat orang. Pesawat yang menyerupai bomber B-2 tersebut melayang dilatarbelakangi pemandangan bukit dan pegunungan berbatu nan tandus”.

“Meskipun tidak secara langsung merujuk insiden membingungkan yang terjadi, bisa dibilang semua saling terkait. Paling tidak merupakan tanda yang jelas adanya hubungan antara dunia dirgantara dan militer, yakni program militer rahasia”.

Tak salah lagi, pesawat 737 misterius yang dipertanyakan, mengangkut karyawan ke pusat uji terbang di dekat Groom Lake Nevada. Wilayah yang oleh publik lebih dikenal sebagai Area51 dan lekat dengan "dunia hitam" karena penuh rahasia.

Pesawat berwarna abu-abu dalam video promosi tersebut adalah Polecat (jenis pesawat tempur), generasi berikut stealth unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Orang merasa, jumpa pers yang dilakukan Cappuccio berikut film yang diputar adalah cara "licik" untuk mengungkap program yang telah berlangsung selama ini.

Jadi, guncangan "gempa" yang tak jelas asalnya kemungkinan besar adalah sonic booms dari pesawat serbu hipersonik seperti selama ini dicurigai orang. Terutama oleh mereka yang antusias terhadap proyek rahasia dan antusiastik militer.

Program rahasia (terklasifikasi) biasanya dikuak untuk mendukung operasi tempur atau saat teknologinya digunakan program lain. F-117 keluar dari Black Project ketika Perang Irak pertama kali 15 tahun silam. Sejak itu hanya tiga pesawat yang diperkenalkan. Yaitu Polecat dan lainnya adalah pesawat intai Tacit Blue produksi Northrop Grumman yang dijuluki "the Whale".

Pesawat ke tiga adalah pesawat Boeing, Bird of Prey. Pesawat ini teruji untuk strategi siluman, termasuk memperkecil bayangan dan kontras. Isunya bahkan pesawat ini memiliki teknik iluminasi yang memungkinkan pesawat untuk berbaur dengan latar belakangnya.

Meskipun beberapa tahun terakhir program seolah berhenti, kelihatannya proyek berjalan kembali. Paling tidak upaya itu ditunjukkan pesawat yang sudah tidak misteri lagi melalui kegiatan akhir-akhir ini. Kegiatan yang tak terlalu padat ini cukup menunjukkan komunitas Black Project tidak tidur.

Bahkan disinyalir sedang dibangun landasan tambahan, serangkaian hangar baru, dan sejumlah bangunan di Area51. Bukti ini bisa dipantau melalui Google Earth. Alokasi anggaran pemerintah USA yang tak jelas dan tak terlacak juga meningkat. Anggaran semacam ini biasa dianggarkan dan kerap menjadi tanda adanya program rahasia. Peningkatan anggaran berarti peningkatan program rahasia.

Lalu kenapa harus rahasia? Jawabannya sederhana, adalah penting untuk menjaga unsur kejutan dalam teknologi yang dikembangkan, berharap untuk mencegah musuh menciptakan strategi guna melawan teknologi tersebut. Tantangannya adalah untuk mencari tahu apa yang sebenarnya terjadi, tanpa mengkhianati keselamatan nasional. Semakin besar dunia hitam, semakin baik kegiatannya tertutup rapat.

Baru-baru ini, New York Time akhirnya berhasil membuat laporan mengenai Area51 berdasarkan pengakuan lima mantan karyawannya. Kolonel Hugh Slater (87) merupakan mantan komandan markas Area 51 pada era 1960-an. Edward Lovick (90) adalah mantan pakar yang selama 30 tahun menguji radar untuk pesawat terkenal, termasuk U-2, A-12 OXCART, dan F-117. Sementara Kenneth Collins (80) adalah mantan pilot tes pesawat CIA. Thornton Barnes (72) dan Harry Martin (77) merupakan mantan insinyur proyek khusus Area51 dan yang bertanggung jawab membangun wahana setengah juta galon persedian bulanan bahan bakar untuk pesawat mata-mata.

Collins pernah menerbangkan pesawat paling rahasia keluar dari Area51 dengan kode nama OXCART. Pesawat itu dibuat oleh Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Saat terbang di atas Utah pesawat mulai melintir dan jatuh ke Bumi. Dia selamat dengan kursi pelontar. Setelah 46 tahun Collins baru diajak melihat kembali pesawatnya yang jatuh pada tahun 2008.

Sedangkan Lovick merupakan ahli fisika yang mengembangkan teknologi siluman. Ia mengatakan tempat itu tidak selalu disebut sebagai Area51. Atasannya pembuat pesawat legendaris, Clarence L Johnson menyebut fasilitas itu sebagai Paradise Ranch bagi orang yang mau meninggalkan keluarganya dan hidup di gurun Nevada yang ganas demi ilmu dan melawan negara jahat.


UFO & Alien

Lalu apakah ada UFO di Area51? Selama bertahun-tahun misteri Area51 dibawa pegawainya hingga ke liang lahat. Namun, pengakuan Collins, Lovick, Slater, Barnes dan Martin tampaknya mengecewakan para Watcher.Mengenai mitos perakitan ulang pesawat UFO yang jatuh, Barnes memberikan pencerahan. "Kami melakukan pembangunan ulang banyak teknologi luar, termasuk pesawat tempur jet Soviet MiG”, katanya. Yang pasti, Pesawat MiG jelas–jelas tidak mirip UFO.

Lalu munculnya pesawat mirip piring terbang dari mana? Bentuk OXCART sangat aneh, tebal dan mirip piring. Bentuk seperti itu karena didesain untuk membawa bahan bakar dalam jumlah besar. Pilot pesawat komersial yang melintas di atas Nevada akan melihat OXCART yang berbalut body titanium akan memantulkan sinar matahari. Apalagi dengan kamampuan bergerak cepat seperti peluru, tidak heran jika akan menyangka sebagai piring terbang.

Sejalan dengan penelitian pesawat tempur yang canggih, diperoleh pula data-data tentang adanya kehadiran mahluk angkasa yang menuju Bumi, yang lebih dikenal dengan nama Alien. Akhirnya, sampailah kita pada suatu pertanyaan seberapa besar kemungkinan keberadaan Alien di alam semesta ini. Untuk hal itu, Area51 telah terlibat dalam penyelidikan teknologi Alien.

Berdasarkan isu yang santer dan dipercaya oleh banyak pakar, bahwa tim Area51 telah menemukan dan menyelidiki secara rahasia reruntuhan UFO yang ditemukan di daerah Roswell, negara bagian New Mexico, Amerika Serikat, tahun 1947. Walaupun belum terdapat pembuktian yang jelas, beberapa pakar luar telah menduga bahwa ilmuwan Area51 diklaim memiliki dan merawat satu mahluk Alien di suatu tempat yang sangat rahasia.

Klaim tersebut diperkuat dengan pengakuan Bob Lazar seorang fisikawan, pada tahun 1989, bahwa dia telah bekerja disalah satu tempat penelitian yang berada pada daerah selatan Area51 dan mengklaim, bahwa Area51 telah melakukan pengujian pesawat terbang yang luar biasa canggihnya dan juga telah melakukan komunikasi dengan Alien.

Keberadaan Alien di Area51 ini menimbulkan suatu teori konspirasi yang merupakan hasil pengumpulan data dari reruntuhan pesawat Alien yang jatuh di Roswell dan pengakuan Bob Lazar pernah terlibat pada kegiatan tersebut, seperti pertemuan atau kontak dengan keadaan di angkasa dengan menggunakan peralatan secukupnya, pengembangan senjata berenergi sangat tinggi dan kegiatan-kegiatan yang secara luas di seluruh dunia.

Berdasarkan isu yang beredar kegiatan teori konspirasi ini dilakukan di Danau Groom yang berada di sekitar lokasi Area51. Namun, sampai sejauh ini belum ada suatu penjelasan ilmiah yang gamblang dalam menjelaskan keberadaan Alien yang sesungguhnya. Usaha yang bisa dilakukan, adalah mengumpulkan data berupa laporan dan foto UFO hasil jepretan amatir. (",)v




Sumber : misteridunia.wordpress.com, kentdra.freeiz.com, berbagai sumber lainnya

Bangsa Viking

Viking adalah suku bangsa dari "Skandinavia", yaitu yang termasuk di dalamnya daratan Norwegia, Denmark, dan Swedia. Diantara tahun 800 dan 1100 M, mereka menduduki, menjarah, menyisir sepanjang pantai barat laut Eropa, sungai-sungai, dan pulau di Eropa, bagian timur Eropa, serta pesisir timur laut Amerika Utara, sampai ke Rusia, dan Konstantinopel, dalam kapal panjang, untuk mencari dan membawa barang rampasan yang sangat berharga.

Kata Viking dipakai belakangan ini saja, masyarakat waktu itu menyebut mereka dengan "Norsemen" (orang utara), sedangkan sumber-sumber utama di Rusia dan Bizantium menyebut mereka dengan nama "Varangian". Sampai sekarang orang Skandinavia modern masih merujuk kepada diri mereka sebagai "Nordbor" (penduduk utara).

Kata Viking mungkin juga berasal dari kata "Vik", yaitu sebuah kota pusat perompak di Norwegia. Ketika para Norsemen pergi sebagai seorang 'Viking', berarti mereka bertarung sebagai seorang perompak. Bangsa Viking Swedia yang menetap di Eropa Timur, mungkin disebut sebagai "Runs", dan jadilah Rusia sebagai nama mereka.

Para Viking membanggakan diri atas keberanian mereka saat berperang, sebagian besar berperang dengan berjalan kaki dan membawa pedang, tombak, serta kapak, sedangkan, para petingginya menggunakan kuda perang. Pasukan "pengejut" disebut "berserker", merekalah yang memimpin serangan.



Berserker adalah bangsa Norse dengan ciri khas 'tanpa mengenakan baju perang besi', dengan tampang yang bengis dan tubuh yang kekar, serta sifatnya yang brutal. Sebelum berperang, mereka menjadi gila bertempur karena mabuk dan narkotika, serta mempercayakannya pada Dewa mereka, yaitu "Odin" (Dewa Perang Bangsa Viking), agar mereka tetap selamat.

Dewa Odin pada Mitologi Nordik, merupakan pemimpin para dewa, yang memiliki peran, sebagai : Dewa Kebijaksaan, Dewa Perang dan Pertempuran, dan Dewa Kematian. Dia dan istrinya, Frigg, adalah penguasa Asgard, termasuk Valhalla, yang merupakan surga bangsa Viking setelah kematian, tempat dimana mereka akan dijamu oleh Dewa Odin sebagai para pahlawan yang tewas dalam pertempuran.


Dewa Odin

Valhalla berada pada Ibukota dari Sembilan Dunia, yaitu Asgard, yang merupakan dunia para Æsir, yaitu golongan Dewa-Dewi tinggi yang paling berkuasa.


Armada Laut


Kapal Viking

Para Viking umumnya terkenal karena merupakan pelaut yang ulung dan tangguh. Kapal-kapal kayu yang mereka buat yang disebut kapal panjang, merupakan sebuah kontruksi kapal laut yang sangat kokoh, ringan, dan mempunyai bagian bawah yang datar, memungkinkan mereka untuk berlayar di sungai yang dangkal dan juga diperairan terbuka. Kapal ini pun mudah dikendalikan untuk perjalanan ekpedisi dengan yang nagivator berpengalaman.

Di Eropa Timur, kapal Bangsa Viking membawa mereka sampai ke pedalaman dan menyusuri berbagai sungai. Mereka bertualang sangat jauh sampai ke daerah Rusia dan Ukraina, kadang-kadang merampok menyisir konstantinopel, yang sering disebut Miklagard / Kota Besar.



Sedangkan para Viking yang tinggal di Perancis Utara disebut Bangsa Norman. Raja mereka yang terkenal adalah William Sang Penakluk, yang menduduki Inggris di tahun 1066.


Penyatuan Norwegia



Wilayah yang kemudian menjadi Norway (Norwegia), tidak disatukan hingga tahun 800. Namun, sebelumnya sudah ada usaha untuk menyatukannya. Dua jenis komunitas dibentuk, yaitu : majelis atau "tings", yang dikelola disekitar Alting, dan kerajaan-kerajaan kecil.

Tentunya ada beberapa alasan yang mendasari, tidak terkecuali keinginan para petani untuk perdamaian dan stabilitas, terutama di daerah pesisir pantai. Hal ini secara berulang kali di ganggu oleh para perampok dan pelecehan bangsa Viking yang kembali.

Daerah pesisir pantai memiliki kekayaan dalam bentuk barang curian yang diperdagangkan. Para raja dari kerajaan kecil menciptakan pernikahan antar kerajaan, yang kemudian menciptakan kekuasaan yang besar.

Raja-raja kecil di Viken – area yang mengelilingi Fjord Oslo, memainkan peran penting dalam proses ini. Kekuasaan mereka secara tetap terus meningkat setelah distrik demi distrik berada dalam kekuasaan mereka.

Setelah perang di Hafrsfjord dekat Stavanger, kira-kira tahun 872, Raja Harad Fairhair memperkuat posisinya sebagai penguasa area yang lebih besar. Namun, proses penyatuan yang berlanjut selama beberapa abad setelahnya, menciptakan pertarungan antara para pemimpin suku Norwegia, dan antara Norwegia dengan masyarakat lain di Utara. Pada tahun 1060, proses penyatuan diselesaikan.


Legenda



Karena tidak adanya sumber tertulis, maka yang diketahui mengenai jaman ini banyak berdasar pada penemuan arkeologi serta cerita-cerita yang beredar. Walaupun kemudian hal-hal tersebut dituangkan dalam tulisan, cerita tersebut berdasarkan pada dongeng yang diturunkan antar generasi pada Mitologi Nordik, yang merupakan kepercayaan masyarakat Eropa utara (Norwegia, Denmark, Swedia, Islandia) sebelum kedatangan agama Kristen. Secara keseluruhan, cerita tersebut mengungkapkan bahwa pada zaman Viking merupakan yang terkaya dalam sejarah pra-sejarah di Utara, Norway.

Namun, dalam cerita-cerita tersebut, tidak semua Bangsa Viking perompak, di tanah airnya, mereka adalah petani, nelayan, pedagang, dan pengrajin, dan yang paling terkenal sebagai perompak. Diantara mereka banyak yang pergi bergabung bersama perompak dan hidup di Perancis utara, Inggris Utara, dan Irlandia. Kerap kali mereka menyerang Inggris dan Irlandia, lalu menjarah hingga ke Gibraltar dan Mediterania.

Terkadang mereka pun memperdagangkan barang-barang dari hasil rampasan. Mereka ini biasanya para perompak yang seringkali gagal dalam berniaga.

Banyak akademis menganggap, penjarahan biara Lindisfarne pada tahun 793, di pesisir North East England sebagai awal Era Viking. Di bagian Barat dan Barat Daya Eropa, hingga saat ini Viking masih dianggap sebagai penjahat kejam yang menciptakan kekacauan dengan menggunakan api dan pedang. Hanya sebagian dari anggapan ini yang benar.



Viking juga datang secara damai untuk berdagang atau bermukim. Bangsa Viking Norwegia bermukim di Orkney Isles, Shetlands, Hebrides dan Pulau Man. Dataran utama di Utara Skotlandia dan Irlandia juga menjadi daerah pemukiman mereka, serta Dublin yang didirikan oleh Viking pada sekitar tahun 840, yang berada dibawah kekuasaan Nordik hingga tahun 1171.

Di Iceland dan Greenland, Viking Norwegia menemukan tanah kosong, dimana mereka menetap dan membangun komunitas. Iceland saat ini diturunkan langsung dari pemukiman Viking. Namun di Greenland, komunitas Norse meninggal beberapa abad kemudian karena alasan yang tidak jelas.

Bangsa Viking membuat kapal yang kuat dan mudah dikendalikan untuk perjalanan ekpedisi dengan nagivator berpengalaman di laut, secara berkala melakukan perjalanan ke Amerika dan kembali.

Cerita mengatakan bahwa Leif Eriksson yang menemukan “Wineland the Good” pada tahun 1001, namun hingga saat ini para akademisi berpendapat bahwa Viking telah mencapai Amerika sebelum Leif. Era Viking mencapai puncak pada tahun 1066 ketika Raja Norwegia, Harald Hardruler dan serdadunya dikalahkan pada Perang Stamford Bridge di England.



Leif Eriksson, yang dalam saga Islandia dikatakan, keturunan para pemimpin Viking Norwegia yang mendirikan perkampungan Eropa pertama di Greenland sekitar tahun 985, kemungkinan besar adalah orang Eropa pertama yang menemukan Amerika sekitar tahun 1000. Perkampungan yang didirikannya kemungkinan besar adalah di L'Anse aux Meadows, yaitu di New found land dan Labrador, Kanada.

Istilah Abad Viking telah dipakai untuk menyebut periode sejarah Skandinavia dari tahu 800 sampai 1066, yaitu sampai pada kematian dari Harald III Sigurdsson.

Sebutan Viking secara luas dapat pula digunakan untuk menyebut seluruh populasi Skandinavia di Abad Viking beserta perkampungan-perkampungan sebarannya. Sebagai contoh, para pedagang dan perompak di masa tersebut yang berasal dari pantai timur Laut Baltik dalam saga Islandia mula-mula disebut sebagai Vikinger fra Estland, atau dalam bahasa Norwegia ialah Viking Estonia.


Peta Rute Ekspansi Bangsa Viking

Penjelajahan bangsa Viking semakin berkurang dan akhirnya berhenti hingga sekarang yang terdengar hanyalah kisah-kisah keperkasaan mereka dalam menaklukkan lautan lewat sebuah legenda. (",)\m/




Sumber : Wikipedia©, misteridunia.wordpress.com, ectic.blogspot.com, berbagai sumber lainnya